UK STRATEGIC DEFENCE

INPUTS OR OUTPUTS? BUDGET DRIVEN OR BATTLE READY?

Earlier essays by Paul Cornish, on Substack and elsewhere, have argued that the UK defence debate has become locked in an input-oriented, budget driven approach that has steadily diluted the UK’s military and strategic credibility. Different terms of reference are now needed, changing UK defence language and mindset from inputs (usually described in terms of the percentage of national income allocated to defence) to outputs. An output-oriented approach would be fundamentally strategic rather than economic, would be concerned with the practical matter of developing and maintaining militarily capable and credible armed forces and would have closely in mind the geographical environments in which UK armed forces might be operationally committed and the allies with whom they will co-operate.

This jointly authored Substack is in five parts:

Part 1. UK Strategic Credibility: After the Oval Office Ambush. By Paul Cornish

Part 2. UK Strategic Credibility: Naval Power. By Peter Roberts

Part 3. UK Strategic Credibility: Land Power. By Jack Deverell

Part 4. UK Strategic Credibility: Air Power. By Greg Bagwell

Part 5. UK Strategic Credibility: Defence Industrial Power. By Paul Hough *

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* Professor Paul Cornish, a former British Army armoured officer, is Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Exeter and Founding Director of the Centre for the Public Understanding of Defence and Security. Peter Roberts became an author, researcher and broadcaster after leaving the Royal Navy. His books, The Western Way of War (2024) and War’s Changed Landscape? are available from Howgate Publishing. General Sir Jack Deverell was a British Army infantry officer whose final appointment was Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe, a NATO post. Since retiring he has been an Associate of Cityforum. Air Marshal Greg Bagwell is a retired Royal Air Force officer and pilot. In addition to commercial roles in the aerospace industry he is current President of the Air & Space Power Association. Paul Hough is a former UK and European defence industry executive and a former adviser to the House of Commons Defence Committee.

Part 1. UK Strategic Credibility: After the Oval Office Ambush

Paul Cornish

The auguries were inauspicious. It was not long before the new (second) administration of US President Trump was attracting headlines with vaguely menacing thoughts concerning the compulsory evacuation and reconstruction of Gaza, the repossession of the Panama Canal and the acquisition of both Greenland and Canada. Menacing, or gratuitous provocation – who knew? But then it got serious.

Early Spring 2025 might be recorded as the moment when the West’s understanding of the post-Cold War settlement, fragile as it had often appeared, finally unravelled. First, at a Nato meeting on 12 February the US Secretary of Defence Hegseth let it be known that the US was bored with Ukraine and bored with European security – European members of Nato should sort out their own security problems. Then, days later at the Munich Security Conference, US Vice President Vance announced that Europe’s problem was much greater than had previously been supposed. Europe, argued Vance, faced a “threat from within” in that it had lost touch with “some of its most fundamental values” – values, insisted Vance, that were shared with the United States. On Friday 28 February 2025 – a ‘day of infamy’ as it has been described – President Zelenskiy of Ukraine, the democratically-elected head of a sovereign country that had been invaded and occupied by autocratic Russia, was subjected to what appeared to be a planned, public humiliation in no less a place than the Oval Office of the President of the United States. Zelenskiy’s error, it seemed, was to have discourteously refused to accept a ‘deal’ involving peace on unfavourable (i.e., Russian) terms.

In a hurried effort to limit the damage, UK Prime Minister Starmer chaired a conference of 13 European heads of government in London on Sunday 2 March. Canada’s Prime Minister Trudeau attended, as did Zelenskiy and leaders of NATO and the European Union. Oddly enough, the leaders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – the Baltic republics widely considered to be the next beneficiaries of Russian revanchism – were not invited in person but did receive a phone call from Starmer before the meeting began. The ostensible aims of the conference were to affirm political and military support for Ukraine, to begin European rearmament, to prepare a draft UK-France-Ukraine peace plan, and to make effusive acknowledgement of the leading role of the United States in ensuring a secure and stable outcome. The last of these backfired spectacularly when Trump chose, unexpectedly, to ‘pause’ the delivery of c.$1bn worth of US military aid to Ukraine. US intelligence assistance to Ukraine soon shared the same fate.

Some cling to the hope that the transatlantic strategic partnership will outlive this turbulence. Others argue that US leadership of NATO, and possibly the strategic integrity of the alliance itself, are now irreparably damaged and should be replaced by a ‘European Treaty Organisation’ of some sort. In either case it is now urgently clear that there is only one policy option open to European governments: rearmament.

The UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR), due for publication at some point in 2025, is a timely opportunity to show that European countries can be better at defence. If the US-European partnership can be sustained, the SDR can be one demonstration to the United States, not just of European bona fides in matters of defence, but also of military effectiveness. If the partnership is doomed, then the SDR can show how European allies can begin to make their own way.

In several essays published on Substack, most recently in December 2024, I have argued for a long-overdue switch in the UK defence debate from ‘input’ to ‘output’. The ‘input’ mindset was characterised by ten years of slavish adherence to the practice of describing defence policy (and a government’s sincerity in matters of defence) narrowly in terms of the per centage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) being allocated to it. Thus, the current UK government demonstrates that it is more robust in defence than its predecessor by declaring that it will increase the defence budget by one fifth of one per cent of GDP: an increase from 2.3% GDP to 2.5% to be achieved, not immediately but by 2027.

An input-determined approach to defence policy and budgeting is deficient, for these reasons:

1. If defence budgeting is expressed in relative terms and as a fixed proportion of a variable (i.e., GDP performance), then it follows that the quantum allocated to defence will float, up or down, as economic performance varies. Unless limit switches are included the defence budget could, as a result, be either higher than is necessary or lower than is needed.

2. The %GDP formula appears to be a non-standard approach to the allocation of UK public finances. In most areas of expenditure (e.g., health, welfare, education, transport) decisions appear to be made on the basis of perceived need and are articulated in terms of absolute cost rather than as a proportion of GDP. For some reason, never satisfactorily explained, UK public spending on defence appears to be in a category of its own.

3. To the extent that defence budgeting is explained, it is often presented as a problem of ‘affordability’. The logic of this explanation is weak. The UK economy is considerable: worth close to US$4 trillion, it is the sixth largest in the world. The UK could ‘afford’ to spend very much more on defence if it chose to do so, even if that meant choosing to spend less in other areas. In other words, the size of the UK defence budget is determined by political choice rather than by some fixed law of nature (or economics). Given the possible implications of going undefended, most competent societies consider defence to be a necessary function and acknowledge the economic, social and (self-evident) security benefits that can accompany investment in their own defence. Yet the belief persists in government that defence is an investment that offers no return. Hence, in the UK, defence is perennially ‘unaffordable’; at best a ’special case’ or a last resort to be contemplated only once everything else has been paid for.

4. The %GDP formula could scarcely be a less imaginative and appealing way of explaining complex public finance decisions. It is an accounting device with no obvious political hinterland and conveys nothing of strategic or military significance (or urgency), either to the public who fund defence or to those who join and serve within the UK Armed Forces. Unsurprisingly, recruitment to UK armed forces is at a low point.

5. The %GDP formula was born of a particular moment. After decades of disagreement over ‘burden-sharing’ within the Alliance, and in light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, NATO members agreed in 2014 to revive a commitment made eight years earlier to increase national defence spending to 2% GDP by 2025. Progress towards that goal was slow and often cantankerous but by 2024 no fewer than 23 NATO member states (of 32) had reached the target. Yet in March 2025, with trans-Atlantic relations having taken a turn for the worse, the %GDP undertaking has now been overtaken by events, having done as much as could be expected of it.

The %GDP formula has come to mean precisely the opposite of strategic thinking. It has allowed governments to pretend – and parliaments and electorates to believe – that a serious, structured discussion is taking place concerning the UK’s capacity, capability and preparedness to use armed force for national and alliance purposes. But as the current state of the UK’s armed forces reveals, that discussion has for several years been anything but serious. The outcome of this chronic self-deceit is profoundly non-Clausewitzian. The Prussian philosopher of war wrote of a foundational ‘trinity’ in which the government, the armed forces and the people are all necessary constituents of the strategic process. What the %GDP formula has resulted in, however, is governments that can avoid the issue (and/or manipulate the calculation by including lines of expenditure that are not in the spirit of the NATO target), armed forces that have been steadily reduced and under-equipped, and public opinion that is unclear about what is going on, and what public money is/is not being spent on.

In the course of just weeks, the international and regional context within which UK national strategy had for decades been shaped has been upended. Some elements of equilibrium might, in time, return but it appears unlikely that the effects of the Oval Office Ambush of 28 February 2025, and its aftermath, can be reversed in full, at least not for four more years. What is needed now is a different way of thinking about UK national strategy and a new, more direct language in which to express it. Rather than input-based thinking, terms of reference are needed that are output-oriented, strategic rather than economic and concerned with strategic credibility rather than budgetary affordability. With this broad goal in mind, the five authors of this essay have conducted a thought experiment based loosely on Max Weber’s ‘ideal type’ model of sociological analysis. Given the UK’s historical, economic, geopolitical and strategic position, what might an ‘ideal type’ force posture look like, one which reflected reasonably and plausibly the country’s current economic, political and geostrategic position?

This Substack is not an attempt to produce an alternative to the UK Strategic Defence Review currently in preparation. Various other pitfalls are also avoided. The authors have not simply drawn up long lists of capabilities and force numbers that will be dismissed as special pleading and/or too costly. Neither have the authors been drawn into yet another abstract discussion of national strategic culture (i.e., whether the UK is naturally and essentially a ‘maritime’ or a ‘continental’ power). So-called ‘paradigm changing’ arguments are not discussed in depth (i.e., the claim that new and evolving technologies such as quantum and UAVs[1] are changing the face of war such that UK defence should be rewritten from scratch). Instead, the Substack takes as its premise that for the foreseeable future a strategically credible UK defence posture will involve the integration of the three core components of armed force: sea power, land power and air power. Each of these elements will require strategic guidance to be set out; doctrine to be written; and equipment to be developed, made and purchased under the auspices of what has come to be known as a defence industrial strategy – the fourth core component of national defence. In each case, what would strategic credibility look like?

We invite comment and criticism from our readers but respectfully ask that one restriction be observed: the response “it’s just not affordable” (or words to that effect) is disallowed. Instead, we ask whether the various assumptions we have made and the postures we have described are, indeed, strategically and militarily necessary, credible and feasible? Or have we set our expectations too high or (just possibly) too low? If too low, what else would be needed for UK armed forces to be credible and effective in defence and deterrence? If too high, how and where should we reduce the scope of our model and with what consequences for our strategic credibility? What risks would be taken with UK defence credibility if the strategic, military and industrial postures that we have outlined are not provided, for whatever reason?

Part 2. UK Strategic Credibility: Naval Power

Peter Roberts

Strategic credibility in naval and maritime power must be underwritten by a sense of realism and pragmatism. In practical terms, credibility lies in the capability to deter adversaries and to take action at the start of a war (90 days of high intensity warfighting to delay adversary advances until support can be arranged) but does not insist on the ability to defeat an opponent alone. This has important ramifications, most notably the acceptance of the reality that operational theatres that have been invaded and occupied will probably not be retaken. For example, the UK does not have the capability to retake the Falkland Islands if a Russian sponsored (and equipped) Argentinian effort were successful in overcoming the defensive measures put in place. Essentially therefore, UK strategic credibility amounts to deterrence through defence and resilience. If external offensive support for major campaigns cannot be found in time, the premise of this (realistic and pragmatic) force posture is that the UK will be enabled to lose slowly for a limited time.

In terms of naval missions, I envisage the following six roles, listed in order of priority:

1. Securing the Western Atlantic.

2. Protection and strategic lift to secure overseas territories and British interests.

3. Protection of British ports, undersea infrastructure, oil and gas fields

4. Enforcement of the sovereignty of UK territorial seas.

5. Meeting the demands of national treaties and obligations, including to NATO, the Commonwealth, Five Power Defence Agreement, and various bilateral treaties to which the UK is a signatory.

6. Operation of an independent nuclear deterrent.

Naval Role 1: Securing the Western Atlantic

Assuming the continued existence of NATO, and with it the critically important role of the United States, the UK’s foremost responsibility will remain that of guardian the Atlantic Western Approaches. Ensuring the safe arrival of US military capabilities on European soil requires the protection of shipping routes and associated undersea infrastructure from the actions of adversaries. The primary threat axis for the next decade will be Russian nuclear attack submarines; secondary threats may arise from limited Chinese naval presence in the region, as well as potential long-range threats from North Korea.

Currently, the European arm of NATO is outclassed, outnumbered, and outwitted in the Western Atlantic by Russian naval forces. Given Russian knowledge and under-ice capabilities, the Arctic Sea is also a contested operational area where Russia holds the upper hand.

Few Allied navies will be able to contribute to the protection of the Atlantic Approaches in a meaningful way, given local vulnerabilities and the needs of self-defence. Responsibility for the Western Approaches will therefore fall largely to the UK alone. Limited support might be forthcoming from the US and French navies but cannot be guaranteed given the likely simultaneity of security challenges. The UK must retain a core capability to secure these areas to ensure the successful transit of shipping to the European theatre.

· Role 1 Force Design Requirements:

o 18 towed array frigates with dedicated embarked dipping-capable helicopters (enough to ensure permanent presence on eight stations at any one time);

o Nine nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines (SSN – assuming six available for operations in the Atlantic and Arctic at any one moment, four on station, with an availability to surge to eight for short periods);

o 18 long range anti-submarine warfare specialised maritime patrol aircraft (enough to maintain constant and persistent presence in eight search areas/stations);

o Four support ships capable of providing underway replenishment of deployed vessels in Atlantic weather conditions;

o Commercially operated deep water ISTAR[2] capability, able to provide surveillance as a service (triggers for the physical presence of submarines or ships and aircraft) across the GIUK[3] gap and up-threat into the Norwegian Sea.

The enterprise will also need to be supported by the necessary naval bases and support infrastructure: nuclear, warfare, logistical, hydrography, databases, communication pathways, and training facilities/expertise/areas.

Naval Role 2: Protection and Strategic Lift to Secure Overseas Territories and UK Interests

With an obligation for security in Overseas Territories (OTs), the UK must maintain the ability to dispatch a force and/or supplies and support capabilities to any of the UK’s fourteen OTs. Given the distances between many of these islands, the UK will need the ability to react in three different places simultaneously (especially if the UK does not base sufficient forces at each location). Furthermore, the UK will need the sovereign capability to withdraw people and assets in non-combatant evacuation operations. (Given that there is usually sufficient warning to withdraw entitled personnel by air, the maritime element of this mission could be dual hatted with the strategic sea lift capability outlined above.)

· Role 2 Force Design Requirements:

o Six medium lift ships, owned and operated by the UK government, rotationally crewed by personnel with the SQEP[4] and national authorisations to undertake security missions;

o Rotary wing, heavy lift aviation to support the above ships and missions;

o Organic ISTAR support (drones or provided as a commercial service);

o Fixed wing aviation capable of delivering firefighting support and disaster relief to OTs (this could be provided as a commercial service);

o Of the total capability required, four assets must be held at immediate readiness, ideally forward-deployed to each of the regional hubs (Mediterranean, Caribbean, Eastern Pacific, South Atlantic, and Indian Ocean).

Naval Role 3: Protection of UK Ports, Undersea Infrastructure, Oil and Gas Fields

The ability to deter, detect threats, and defend against adversaries within British waters and those of OTs. These vessels will require the sensors, communications, personnel, and weapons to provide a credible deterrence against potentially hostile actors at little notice. Naval Role 3 also requires the ability to detect, monitor, deter and act against adversaries planning or undertaking attacks on UK maritime infrastructure, including undersea cables and pipelines, oil and gas installations, and general UK shipping (including fishing vessels). Shore authorities in UK ports will also require support, both for day-to-day operations and in emergencies.

· Role 3 Force Design Requirements:

o Seven coastal response squadrons, consisting of small and medium sized patrol craft, rotary and fixed wing support aircraft, drone and satellite support;

o A national maritime headquarters with nodes to a coastal protection surveillance network with persistent and overlapping coverage of all sea areas;

o A surveillance and response system capable of monitoring and detecting underwater threats to all undersea infrastructure at a 50% revisit time over a 48-hour period (this could be provided as a commercial service);

o A national high response maritime mine countermeasure, minelaying and sweeping capability.

Naval Role 4: Obligations in UK and OT Territorial Waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)

The responsibility for safety and security in UK and OT waters is divided between a range of governmental and non-governmental agencies and bodies: HM Coastguard, Border Force, RNLI and other Search and Rescue (SAR) initiatives. In some cases, these maritime areas are extensive. Marine accident investigation, regulation and inspection duties are conducted by civil authorities.

Naval involvement in these activities is likely where there is the potential for an armed and lethal response, where permissions for enforcement lie with the naval forces, or where activity by other national agencies is deemed cost ineffective (e.g., the raising of dedicated SAR and fisheries enforcement in the South Atlantic. Naval forces undertaking such missions will need the capability to deter threats from adversaries and from other actors and will require equipment appropriate for very severe weather conditions. In other cases (e.g., Gibraltar and Cyprus) there could be a requirement for armoured hulls to counter WBIED[5] threats. An extremely high readiness maritime counter terrorism capability will be needed to respond to threats to oil and gas infrastructure, to enable opposed interception and boarding of vessels and submersibles, and to be EOD[6] enabled. The maritime counter terrorism (CT) capability will need to be globally deployable, supported by organic rapid response lift capabilities.

· Role 4 Force Design Requirements:

o Seven coastal response squadrons, each comprising four small and four medium sized patrol craft, rotary and fixed wing support aircraft, drone and satellite support;

o A surveillance and response system capable of monitoring and detecting underwater threats to all undersea infrastructure at a 50% revisit time over a 48 hour period;

o A national high response maritime mine countermeasure, minelaying and sweeping capability.

Rather than form an additional set of requirements, these may be dual hatted with other missions. Units will, nevertheless, need to be designed and equipped with systems appropriate to climatic and other conditions in which they will be expected to operate. Surveillance requirements could be provided by a commercial entity, delivering surveillance as a service.

Naval Role 5: Compliance with Treaties and Obligations, Including NATO[7], the Commonwealth, the Five Power Defence Agreement

Naval Role 5 envisages a deployable maritime force capable of acting as a response force to global crises and emergencies where the UK participates as part of a wider coalition.

· Naval Role 5: Force Design Requirements:

o 12 surface combatants: four guided missile destroyers and eight guided missile frigates, each with organic and embarked rotary wing, strike aviation and long-range persistent surveillance capabilities;

o Three nuclear -powered hunter-killer submarines (SSN);

o Three support ships (two AOR, one AFSH[8]).

Naval Role 6: Operation of an Independent Nuclear Deterrent

If the UK determines that it requires a nuclear deterrent in addition to conventional means of meeting the basic obligations of defence and national security, the state could determine that the submarine based independent nuclear missile armed solution continues to be the way it will be delivered. This methodology of operating nuclear weapons is the least vulnerable to detection but also the most expensive of the options available.

· Naval Role 6: Force Design Requirements

o Four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN);

o Three nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines (SSN);

o Three towed array frigates with dedicated and embarked dipping sonar capable rotary wing aviation;

o Three maritime patrol aircraft;

o Seabed surveillance capability across UK waters to localise threats and mitigate detection of SSBN platforms on departure for patrol.

Summary

This naval/maritime force design is premised on US adherence to NATO founding principles for the maintenance of security in Europe and the North Atlantic. On this premise, what is described above is the minimum UK naval posture to ensure credible defence and deterrence. All units are assumed to have adequate protection from air, surface and subsurface threats in a co-ordinated threat scenario against current Russian capabilities. All units will require the full complement of offensive and defensive capabilities (in contrast to the RN habit of ‘fitting-for-but-not-with’ the requisite systems). Adequate training grounds and facilities will be needed, together with a dedicated naval logistics, supply and support infrastructure that works in partnership with industry and commercial entities, as well as with partner agencies across government. Any requirement for naval infantry (for maritime CT, boarding, interdiction, and force protection) is assumed to be at no more than battalion level. Command and organisation of this tactical force (and financial liability for it) could fall under UK land power.

Should the US no longer adhere to the NATO founding principles, the cost of ensuring security in North Atlantic/Western Approaches, the Arctic Ocean and in European waters would be cost prohibitive for European states to shoulder without a 20 year lead time.

Part 3. UK Strategic Credibility: Land Power

Jack Deverell

What is land power for?

The Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu’s The Art of War contains a line that still resonates some 2,500 years after its publication: ‘the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.’ This result might be achieved through the use of deception and manoeuvre. And it can also be achieved through deterrence. The logic behind the UK’s nuclear deterrent is that it continues to prevent catastrophic nuclear exchanges between the nuclear superpowers. As is often pointed out, the UK’s nuclear deterrent failed to deter President Putin from invading Ukraine in 2014 and then again in 2022. But that was, arguably, never the purpose of the UK nuclear deterrent. What seems less controversial is the claim that Putin gambled successfully that NATO nations did not have the political will to commit armed forces in support of Ukraine. When it came to the task of conventional (i.e., non-nuclear) deterrence, NATO nations were, in effect, politically self-deterred. Political will or not, Putin may have judged that, in some cases, NATO’s conventional forces were simply insufficiently equipped or trained to be deployed with any confidence that they might prevail in conflict. Deterrence demands the demonstration of capability and will to use it.

How best to achieve conventional deterrence – with naval, land or air power? One argument, aired periodically, is that the UK should prioritise its naval/maritime and air power at the expense of its land power and that the UK’s commitment of land forces to NATO should be reduced accordingly. Another recurring view is that the UK land forces should offer niche capabilities such as special forces, cyber and electronic warfare, allowing the UK to concentrate on much enhanced maritime and air capabilities. While arguments such as these would make the allocation of scarce defence resources a relatively straightforward matter, ‘role specialisation’ of this sort begs two serious questions. First, does the UK possess the ship and aircraft building capacity and skills base to make the enhancement of UK naval and air power feasible within a realistic timescale and at reasonable cost? Second, what might be the reaction of our allies if UK land power were not to be committed in strength to a major land campaign? Is it likely or even merely possible that allies would consider our concentration on naval and air power at the expense of ground forces to indicate disengagement? Unwillingness to commit ground forces could indicate to friend and foe alike that the UK is unwilling to bear its share of the human casualty and equipment attrition rates that go hand in hand with high intensity conflict. It becomes difficult to see, as a result, that the UK could claim to be serious about deterring potential aggressors and may instead be seen to have placed self-interest above alliance cohesion; convenience before necessity. Furthermore, the absence of UK (and, since February 2025, US) operational experience and capabilities would not easily be replaced and the absence of British officers in senior command appointments would very likely limit UK national influence over the prosecution of a land campaign. More broadly, a policy of disengagement from a decisive theatre of operations may well damage the wider international reputation and authority of the UK.

An image problem?

Land power has the habit of revealing its value unexpectedly, and in spite of the professed wisdom and foresight of analysts. Few questioned the utility and relevance of the British Army during the Cold War and during operations in Northern Ireland, Kuwait, Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Kosovo. Consistently demonstrating its professional competence and enviable reputation, the Army has also provided invaluable training assistance to Ukrainian land forces since 2014. Yet the image of the British Army has long been shaped by lazy and ill-informed commentary, typified by the claim that, if it came to it, the Army ‘could always find infantry if and when necessary’.

The failure of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan could have undermined confidence that land power can deliver a decisive result without resulting in casualty rates and collateral damage that provoke national and international concern. Perhaps, as a result, the Army has come to be seen as something of a blunt instrument, lacking the finesse of naval/maritime and air power? Both naval and air power can, after all, be held at distance and their tasking and targeting can be more readily managed, if required, at the highest military and even political levels. And if, as seems the case, the Army is struggling to convince politicians and public opinion of its continued utility and relevance, that might be a consequence of the decades during which terrorism was thought to pose the major threat to the UK. The prospect of state-on-state conflict has long seemed remote, particularly in Europe. This complacent outlook changed – or at least should have – with the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Past, present or future?

It is a truism that armies should prepare for the next war and not the last. Yet the nature of any future war is notoriously difficult to predict. The remarkable evolution of drone warfare in Ukraine has occurred because war created both the necessity and the opportunity. The use of complex and expensive weapon systems, many for the first time, has also been widespread. Yet many aspects of the war in Ukraine carry the marks of the past. Ideas might be generated about the nature of future threats and the role of new technology in shaping the battlefield to our advantage. But establishing an agreed picture upon which future strategy can be based and against which investment can be made can be difficult, particularly while the ‘marks of the past’ have not yet been erased.

The British Army must be structured, equipped and trained to fight a war that might occur in the short term. Yet a balance must be maintained between current/short term future necessity and the development of systems and methods geared for the longer term. This balance must be carefully managed if it is not to result in loss of capability. Change in the military is largely evolutionary and large-scale transformation takes time and effort. Perversely, the smaller the army the more difficult it can be to manage major transformational programmes. If units and formations are taken out of their operational roles for re-equipping and are not substituted on a like for like basis, the result is likely to be a loss of operational readiness.

“We want two, so see it through”

If size matters in transformation, so it does in deployment. If the UK is to continue to commit a division to NATO it must be battle-worthy and able, on demand, to deliver the promised combat power within an allied force structure. A division has all the components necessary to act independently. A brigade, conversely, does not normally act independently and would require assets held at divisional level. Size also implies command influence: a British divisional commander will be able to exert greater influence on the way a battle is to be fought than a less senior officer (e.g., a brigade commander).

The British Army is actually configured around two divisions: 1^st (UK) Division which comprises various light and specialist land power functions and is designed to be ‘a land component command of a joint and multi-domain sovereign Global Response Force’; and the 3^rd (UK) Division which is designed to be a fully deployable armoured division enabled to ‘warfight’ under command of NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and to ‘meet the shift from close to deep battle.’

In 1908, in the midst of the Anglo-German naval arms race, popular support for the new Dreadnought class battleship was conveyed in rhyme: “We want eight and we won’t wait”. While poetry does not work quite so well in garnering support for the British Army’s two division structure, the sentiment behind the rhyme is not dissimilar, particularly when it is understood that UK land power has, over time, been hollowed out in both fighting power and, just as importantly, sustainability. Size is important, but it is not everything: sustainability, recruitment, equipment, technology and training are all key to ensuring the strategic credibility of UK land power.

Military history tells us that ‘quick wars’ have often turned into the very opposite. Given the casualty rates and equipment losses witnessed in Ukraine, it seems unlikely that the deployed 3 (UK) Division could remain operationally viable for more than a few weeks, if that. Long term sustainability is likely to be beyond the scope of current UK force levels, regulars and reservists alike. For the division to sustain operations for some months there would need to be a steady supply of trained reservists and replacement equipment to maintain force levels and combat power. At present, however, the British Army faces serious challenges in both recruiting and retention of soldiers These could be mitigated by improvements in pay and accommodation and by easing the medical standards for entry into the Armed Forces. There is talk of substituting the soldier on the battlefield with robots and autonomous vehicles. This could offer possibilities in reconnaissance and other tasks but for as long as there is a need to ‘seize and hold ground’ it may be some time before the human soldier can be replaced, rather than assisted by, a machine. Investment in future technology is important but, again, such investment must not be at the expense of current requirements. In the short term, those deployed to fight must have the means available to secure success.

Sustainability also applies to the design of vehicles and equipment. For example, questions arise regarding the suitability of the Boxer Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (MIV) in the deep battle. The variant expected to be deployed in 3(UK) Division has no firepower apart from an externally mounted machine gun and it does not have the protection levels of the Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle that it will replace. To fit appliqué armour and/or a turreted cannon would make the vehicle heavier, compromise its battlefield mobility and increase the cost. Boxer-borne infantry would likely find it more difficult to close with the enemy and seize and hold ground. One observation from Ukraine is the preponderance of Russian artillery and its value in the in both support and denial of manoeuvre. The lesson for the Boxer procurement could be that the trade-off between mobility and protection will undermine infantry combat effectiveness.

Innovation in information technology will also have a central role in UK land power. The dramatic increase in the availability of real or near-real time information has meant that decision making, although in some respects improved, has become slower, more complex and more difficult. This bears upon the ‘manoeuvrist’ approach that lies at the heart of UK land power doctrine and particularly upon the ambition to operate within an adversary’s decision cycle. If our own decision cycle is too slow or too cautious then operations are unlikely to be conducted at a tempo with which the enemy cannot cope. It is here that the development of AI will be critically important in allowing complex instructions (fire plans or movement orders for example) to be generated within a few minutes rather than tens of minutes or hours, in improving operational tempo and perhaps also in allowing headquarters to become smaller, more agile and less vulnerable.

Finally, a serious limitation on the strategic credibility of UK land power is the lack of live (as opposed to virtual) training opportunities above battlegroup level. Any organisation, military or civil, must train often and rigorously if it is to be fit for purpose when required. The purpose of training, self-evidently, is to inculcate the highest professional standards and to build up cohesion and resilience that will be essential during times of emergency and stress and that can also contribute to the deterrent effect. Yet training is too often considered either an optional cost or a risk-laden activity that runs the risk of reputational and/or political damage. The result can be military training that is under-funded and risk averse and does not properly prepare individuals for the ‘shock of war’. Similar things might be said of formation-level training in the British Army (i.e., brigade and divisional level). Virtual training has reached remarkable levels of sophistication and granularity but it cannot replicate the real manoeuvre of large scale armoured forces across real terrain and the real chaos that can and will ensue. Formation-level training of this sort requires space and infrastructure, neither of which the UK now has, with Salisbury Plain being too small and the battlegroup training area in Alberta, Canada no longer being used by the British Army. There is much to be said for the establishment of a European field training area to train up to two manoeuvre brigades simultaneously under command of a static divisional headquarters. If such a facility were ever in prospect, it would be an initiative through which UK land power could consolidate and develop in conjunction with allies.

Summary

The British Army is now smaller than it has been for about 200 years. Some might see this as history’s judgement on a standing army in a maritime nation that has experienced civil war. Yet the British Army is now more relevant and has a clearer purpose than since the ending of the Cold War in the 1980s. And it still has the reputation to match. The strategic credibility of UK land power can be assured if the recommendations made in this essay are understood, implemented and maintained by UK government.

Military transformation is always necessary, but it must always be conducted carefully, as a problem of managed evolution rather than revolution. With its two divisional structure the British Army is optimally configured for the foreseeable future and, importantly, can be scaled to meet the unforeseen. This structure requires no further reorganisation and it can be no smaller if it is to remain scaleable and retain its strategic credibility. The deployable 3 (UK) Division must be exactly as described – a fully deployable, self-contained division able to fight the deep battle. The formations and units of 1 (UK) Division are equally vital for the close battle and the various combat support and combat service support units and sub-units found within UK Field Army are no less essential. The sustainability and resilience of formations and units is critically important. Recruiting must be improved, in the first place by improving conditions of service. Vehicles and equipment must be procured that are appropriate to the tasks expected of them. Information and other technology must be incorporated, but as a multiplier of land power effect rather than a substitute for it. And the entirety of UK land power should be subject to a rigorous, ambitious and realistic training programme. In short, the task facing UK government is not to construct UK land power ab initio. The task, instead, is to build capacity and unlock the strategic credibility of what already exists.

Part 4. UK Strategic Credibility: Air Power

Greg Bagwell

Filling the gap

Since February 2025 NATO and its member nations have found themselves in a very different place from where they thought they were just a few months ago. As governments consider, individually and collectively, how to re-energise their defence effort, it has become painfully clear that unending debate about defence budgeting must now cease. Concrete outputs are now needed to shore up or replace the security apparatus and deterrent credibility that have long been assumed. And this reorientation must at least have in mind the worst-case assumption that the support of the US can no longer be guaranteed.

The positive news is that NATO’s air and space domains and capabilities are all highly advanced, sophisticated and integrated – and are designed, equipped and configured with a Russian threat in mind. The two things they most obviously lack are mass and resilience, but these require investment, not a fundamental redesign. Interoperability is designed into current systems and procedures, and seamless operation is possible across boundaries and roles. NATO’s current air and space power overmatches that of Russia in terms of the quality of equipment, training and of tactics – but that qualitative edge inevitably becomes less credible when some or all of the US contribution is removed. Where air and space capability are concerned, the UK contribution stands at the top of European nations alongside France. The price paid in maintaining such a broad span of capabilities is a lack of mass. Yet while this lack of depth is a strategic weakness, the broad suite of capabilities (with some unique assets) amount to a solid framework that can be built upon rapidly to backfill some of the more exquisite capabilities provided largely by the US.

The UK has four strategic options for the air and space domain, ranged on a sliding scale of increasing ambition and, inevitably, cost. The four broad options, discussed below, are Consolidated Defence, Resilient Deterrent, Alliance Leader and Global Force. As well as ambition and cost, there is one other variable that is common to all four options: consideration of national industrial growth and self-reliance. And it should also be borne in mind that each of these options will require the firm underpinning of a robust recruitment & retention mechanism; responsive and resilient logistic support; and an effective and efficient procurement system

Air Power Option 1: Consolidated Defence

As a minimum, the UK should maintain a consolidated and credible defensive force, capable of repelling any air or missile attack on the UK and her overseas territories. Accordingly, urgent consideration should be given to the absence of an integrated UK air and missile defence system of any meaningful shape or size (i.e., one capable of protecting critical national infrastructure from cruise and ballistic missile attack); the hardening and protection of key vulnerabilities from air and missile attack; and the rapid rebuilding of stockpiles of anti-aircraft and missile weapons/effectors to sustain a prolonged defence. Although aspects of the air defence revival are already underway, the cost of the programme should not be under-estimated and must be covered in full; an air defence system with gaps is probably worse than none at all.

Consolidated Defence invites consideration of the UK’s ability to project air and air defence power beyond its borders. Could a defence-oriented UK air and space force allow any capabilities to be deployed elsewhere? Since a defensive mindset would, presumably, constrain UK naval and land power aspirations, then perhaps fixed wing and rotary airlift capacity could be reduced overall. The programmed replacement for the RAF’s venerable Puma medium support helicopter might, for example, come under pressure in the SDR. The UK’s most sophisticated ISTAR[9] assets might also be reviewed as these would be vulnerable in a full-scale, peer-on peer conflict. And finally, a defensive orientation might bring some or all of the projected F-35 purchase under scrutiny, particularly if the UK-led GCAP[10] becomes too big and politically important to cancel. The F-35 programme has obvious implications for the size and flexibility of future carrier-strike operations, but this capability might also be reconsidered in a defence-minded strategy. In any case, assuming no growth in the UK’s fast jet capability, with a little under six front-line Typhoon and two F-35 Lightning squadrons, Consolidated Defence would have very little spare capacity to take on wider missions beyond the air defence of the UK and its Overseas Territories. Consolidated Defence would therefore represent a dramatic reduction in UK ambition and capability in an increasingly unstable geostrategic environment and so is unlikely to be considered further.

Air Power Option 2: Resilient Deterrent

Option 2 builds upon the minimum essential provision of Consolidated Defence to create a more resilient and capable force able to make a more sizeable contribution beyond UK borders, taking the fight to the enemy. Assuming that current capabilities can manage the UK’s defensive tasks, then additional combat units would be required for offensive attack missions. As a minimum, this would require at least another four front line combat squadrons, perhaps two each of the F-35 and the latest version of Typhoon. Any doubts about reliance on US support, and a likely focus on the NATO region for the Royal Navy, might favour more of the Typhoon, or even a switch to the land-based F-35A model for its increased range and payload. Either way, this would be a modest increase to the capability and budget and would offer more to any alliance. But the Resilient Deterrent option would not replace the missing US enablers, and nor would it necessarily confer the moral authority to take a leading role in a coalition.

Air Power Option 3: Alliance Leader

The Alliance Leader role would require all elements of Options 1 and 2 to be in place, with the addition of key enablers (air-to-air refuelling, command and control structures, ISTAR etc.) to ensure that it was a net contributor in these capabilities, rather than a customer. Space-based capabilities would be necessary to provide increased and more resilient communications and surveillance assets. Greater numbers of key strategic air platforms such as tankers and AEW would also be necessary. The former could be achieved relatively easily by converting A400Ms, although additional Voyager/A330 multi-role tanker transport aircraft with boom refuelling would be valuable for some UK and coalition assets. As for AEW, with the imminent arrival of two new radars the RAF should soon be in a position to increase its nascent fleet of three E-7 Wedgetails to five, and for a relatively modest outlay. The size of the P-8 Poseidon MPA fleet might also be reconsidered, although it might be possible to convert Protector RPA to that role. Last but not least, the UK would also need to contribute to air & space command & control in any alliance it joined (or led). Without US involvement, aviators practiced in air battle management will be highly prized and the UK should be preparing now to fill senior appointments in this area.[11]

Air Power Option 4: Global Force

If, given current uncertainties, the UK were not to adhere to a NATO first posture/policy then it would be necessary to increase the size of the UK’s deployable air wings (maritime and/or land based) and deployable airfield capacity, with the enablers to match. If this were to be maritime-heavy (focused on deterring China, for example) then the carrier-optimised F-35B would be the only option currently available to the UK. At least three more F-35B squadrons would be needed to make this option viable at scale. The awkward reality, however, is that this model of the F-35 lacks the reach and the current weapons or capacity to be credible in that scenario. It would be necessary, therefore, to consider other options that are, perhaps, RPA-based. However, both the current geopolitical context and the likely development time for carrier-based RPA, suggests that this option would not be achievable in the near future.

National Industrial Growth and Self-Reliance

Maintaining a national and even a European defence industrial base will become increasingly important as reliance on the US becomes less desirable. Improved defence industrial capacity, redundancy and resilience should, arguably, be a goal in any case: a growing and more robust defence industry will have benefits for the national economy and aligned defence investment and should ensure that the UK retains some very highly specialised capabilities. There are, significantly, several areas where the UK is either deficient or highly (i.e., overly) reliant on US provision and which should be addressed as a priority: space launch, resilient satellite constellations and artificial intelligence, for example. UK air power currently has a preponderance of US platforms, sensors and systems. It might not be feasible to find substitutes for all of these overnight, but where possible the reliance on US capabilities could be reviewed, either through national or European programmes. There are already indications of a more constructive, self-reliant way forward. The promise of autonomous vehicles (particularly the more advanced and reusable versions in which the RAF is most interested) and the vast GCAP Tempest programme both offer the prospect of considerable national economic growth while diminishing the UK’s reliance on the US, strengthening partnerships with other allies and future proofing UK air power for the next 50 years.

Summary

I have set out four options for strategic credibility in UK air power: Consolidated Defence; Resilient Deterrent; Alliance Leader; and Global Force. Which to choose? It is, regrettably, inevitable that the options I have described will be translated into budgetary liabilities. That is not a difficult task to undertake. Assuming all other things to be equal (i.e., no significant shift in the proportions of investment across the military domains), then Option 1 could be achievable within current fiscal headroom. Option 2 could be close to or above the projected defence budget of 2.5% GDP (by 2027). Option 3 could be at the more distantly projected 3% GDP, or a little in excess of it. Option 4 could be well above 3% GDP. If the goal of National Industrial Growth and Self-Reliance is factored in then it will be seen as yet more pressure on the UK’s public finances, even though the return may well outweigh the investment in the longer run. In budgetary terms, the rational choice would probably be Option 1, resisting all pressures to rise above the bare minimum of Consolidated Defence. But in strategic terms, the rational place to begin the discussion would be at Option 4, with coherent and robust explanations and risk assessments provided for any choices that limit the UK’s strategic credibility by preventing the attainment of a Global Force capability.

Part 5. UK Strategic Credibility: Defence Industry

Paul Hough

After three years of war on the European continent defence is suddenly at the centre of the news cycle in the United Kingdom and across Europe. In late February 2025 the UK Prime Minister announced an increase in defence spending expressed as a percentage of GDP. The ending of the Cold War was, arguably, as much the result of economic strength as military power but in more recent years it has become clear that economic, financial and management priorities have become the dominant theme of geopolitics. The epitome of this worldview is the presentation of military capability as the percentage of GDP spent on defence and is perhaps most evident in the procurement of defence systems, products and services.

The economic perspective had led to an obsession with inputs (i.e., the percentage of GDP, and process and efficiency, often expressed as ‘value for money for the taxpayer’) at the expense of outputs (i.e., the right equipment delivered at the right time for a fair and reasonable price). It often appears that success in contract battles, compliance with process and demonstration of value for money is more important than delivery of the output. In other words, in military parlance it is the ‘ways and means’ that become the objectives, not the ‘ends’. Although this approach is understandable in most commercial environments, failure to deliver in defence leads to the absence of military capability that may, ultimately, threaten the nation, its interests and the way of life of its population,

Capability – Military and Industrial

A simple definition of military capability is the effective combination of well trained and well led people with good quality equipment, where quality is measured in terms of technology and reliability. By this definition, the procurement of such equipment and the ability of the industrial base to deliver becomes critical to the generation of forces that are capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating adversaries. The industrial base thus becomes a key element of defence capability, rather than a market similar to other sectors. This is demonstrated by the US approach to industrial strategy; by the outcome of the Cold War; and by the capacity required by Russia and Ukraine to sustain operations since February 2022.

The market for defence products system and services is in effect a monopsony; that is a market structure in which a single buyer, or a small group of buyers, controls the market as the major purchaser of goods and services offered by sellers. A feature of a monopsony is that in the absence of purchases from the dominant buyer sellers exit the market or reduce capability and capacity to match the demands of the buyer, where the costs of exit are prohibitive. In these circumstances the buyer holds the risk that products systems and services are no longer available to procure and the benefits of a perceived competitive market are illusory. In a more orthodox economic interpretation of defence procurement the buyer would assume that the market for defence equipment and services is competitive market; similar in nature and operation to markets for consumer goods or business to business goods where there are many buyers and sellers and the barriers to entry are low. Yet large parts of the defence market, as well as being monopsonistic, are capital intensive and require specific knowledge and skills.

The result of this non-alignment of views has been that the industrial base is considered to be outside and separate from military capability, such that direct cost, and process governance have become the paramount considerations of defence procurement. The outcome is adversarial relationships between the industrial base and the Ministry of Defence and an industrial capability that is driven by efficiency and corporate returns rather than resilience and coherence with miliary outcomes.

Defence Industrial Strategising

The UK Government has a habit of undertaking Strategic Defence Reviews, some expanded to Strategic Defence and Security Reviews. These documents tend to be verbose, lacking in strategic content and with little or no apparent impact on national defence and security. In recent cycles the reviews have been accompanied by Defence Industrial Strategies. The title indicates that the document might be a recognition of the importance of the defence industrial base to national defence. However, in line with the growing pervasiveness of economics in geopolitical analysis, UK Defence Industrial Strategies have focused increasingly on growing and sustaining that element of the defence industrial base that is located in the UK and have shared more with industrial strategies for other sectors such as green energy than with delivering effective military outcomes. If the perspective were to be changed, such that the industrial base was considered critical to the nation’s defence and security, then a genuine, bespoke industrial strategy for defence would be required,

It could be argued that the United States and China each have a defence industrial base that makes them self-sufficient in defence equipment, although there are elements of the deeper supply chain such as raw materials where both nations are reliant on others. For the UK, and other European nations, the industrial base that delivers defence equipment and services is necessarily international and shared between allies. The critical mass required to establish and maintain capacity that can build and sustain stockpiles is not affordable by any one nation. The lack of coordination between nations, combined with the drive for efficiency and the desire to sustain some level of national defence industrial capability, means that capacity has been reduced and resilience has been eliminated.

In the Cold War confrontation with the USSR, NATO was effectively an alliance of substantial national forces that were of sufficient size to allow national variations in equipment. For example, the UK had a Main Battle Tank (MBT) with a rifled gun whilst other NATO nations adopted a smooth bore weapon. Similarly, there was a variety of artillery systems across the Alliance. This was possible because the demand from the buyers in Europe was sufficient to sustain a substantial industrial base, which was international. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the European members of NATO have maintained national requirements, resulting in a contraction of the industrial base, which remains fragmented. For example, the requirements of the British Army could not sustain a domestic (UK) energetic material production capability (i.e., explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics etc.). The drive for efficiency means that there are now only one or two sources for such materials in Europe, and these have not had the capacity to ramp up production to meet the huge demand from Ukraine without significant capital costs. In response to the demand for/from Ukraine the magazines of Europe have been emptied, such that the European NATO members now face a huge task to replenish what were already diminished stocks, before addressing the need to dramatically increase capacity beyond the pre February 2022 levels. This challenge is similar across most categories of military equipment. If Europe, including the UK, is to build a military capability that can take on the burden of defending itself in the absence of US support, then a resilient industrial base with technological capability and capacity is essential.

A UK Defence Industrial Strategy…

The UK Strategic Defence Review will have a Defence Industrial Strategy element. A Defence Industrial Strategy ‘Statement of Intent’ was published in December 2024, the final section of which (‘Next Steps’) contains the following form of words:

The Defence Industrial Strategy will be developed at pace. It will be informed by, but remain separate from, the Strategic Defence Review and will be published in late Spring 2025, with a remit extending to 2035. It will be a sector plan as part of the wider Government’s Industrial Strategy. [Emphasis added]

This gives the game away. Whatever role it will serve, the forthcoming Defence Industrial Strategy will not be an industrial strategy for defence. It will focus, instead, on the economic performance of the companies located in the UK. This begs an obvious question: what could an industrial strategy for defence look like?

… or an Industrial Strategy for Defence?

In the first place it would be useful to state the outputs of the industrial base that would meet the requirements of a robust military capability for Europe (including UK). I suggest that ‘military capability’ requirements can be considered under three headings: technology, capacity, and resilience. If there is broad agreement on these requirements it should be possible to assess the ways and means by which they could be delivered.

The industrial base should demonstrate the ability to deliver systems and products that are at the cutting edge of technology. This means taking risk in innovation: not all ideas will be fielded; government and industry will need to have an appetite for failing, and failing quickly, to ensure that new technology is rapidly adopted rather than being strangled by a risk averse procurement process. The current requirement to demonstrate ‘value for money’ (in itself an absurd proposition – how to assess the ‘value’ of a MBT in other than tactical and operational terms?) would be replaced by an acknowledgement that failure is a necessary feature of healthy innovation.

Three years of war in Ukraine has shown that rapid adoption of new technology is essential for effective operations. It has also clearly demonstrated that this is in addition to, rather than in place of, the deployment of mass effects by ground forces. In Ukraine, artillery has played a critical role with the supply of 155mm ammunition from Europe and the United States. This has stretched manufacturing capacity in Europe and the US and has caused European nations to deplete stockpiles to dangerously low levels. The establishment of manufacturing capacity to support the generation and sustainment of military mass will require significant investment over years.

The ability to innovate rapidly and to develop (and maintain) the capital-intensive facilities required for operations at scale, are key elements of a resilient industrial base. A third element would be redundancy at key points in the supply chain to mitigate the risk of disruption, that may be deliberate or otherwise.

To meet these requirements it is essential to coordinate and consolidate, on the one hand demand from the various buyers and, on the other hand supply from a fragmented industrial base. This effort would doubtless would be facilitated by a drive for commonality of systems and products and consideration of technological availability and capacity across Europe, rather than the sustainment of national champions. This effort would also require consolidation of programmes and companies. How can it be thought rational and credible, for example, for Europe to invest in not one but two sixth generation fighter programmes – the Global Combat Air Programme where UK and Italy are partnered with Japan, and the Future Combat Air System where Germany, France and Spain are teamed. In spite of protests that national capacity must be maintained, it has to be asked whether this lack of coordination is justifiable in terms of time, technology and money, and whether the duplication of programmes supports or hinders European military capability? How many different models of core armoured vehicles (tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles etc) does Europe really need?

Defence spending in Europe is increasing, at a pace that can only increase as/if the US reduces its commitment to European security and defence. In these circumstances it would be irresponsible, and fundamentally non-strategic, to expect the market to configure the industrial base that will be essential to the generation of effective European military capability. Companies are driven by outcomes that are not necessarily aligned with the needs of armed forces facing the possibility of armed conflict. Furthermore, the national procurement processes that have overseen the decline of the European defence industrial base are unlikely to be fit for purpose in effectively allocating the increased funds needed for future military outcomes. A world view that sees the defence industry supply chain as one component of military capability requires a partnership between governments and companies rather than confrontation or ‘customer relations’. As a quid pro quo, the financial returns available to companies should be fair and reasonable judged against the risk they will be invited to take. The surge in defence company share prices since February 2022 may be a necessary revaluation rather than an opportunistic move. But it should nevertheless be clear that collaboration rather than confrontation between governments and companies should not provide windfall returns to commercial stakeholders.

Summary

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 should have shifted the defence paradigm among European nations from the economic to the military, and from decline to urgent recapitalisation.It did not.The support of the United States for Ukraine, albeit in the face of resistance from Republican members of Congress, meant that Europe continued to assume that it could avoid (or at least moderate) the huge effort that is required to establish a meaningful European defence capability.The change of US Administration in January 2025 has shocked Europe out of its torpor.As Europe rushes to reverse the decline of its military capability it would be a mistake to maintain the economic, market driven, arm’s length, approach to the defence industrial base that has been pervasive since the end of the Cold War and has overseen its contraction.Similarly, companies in the industrial base should seek to align their operations with military outcomes, rather than corporate targets, in return for the long term collaboration that will be necessary to develop technology, construct capacity and build resilience.The UK will be a significant contributor to any meaningful European defence capability.With that in mind, it is essential that the UK shifts from a Defence Industrial Strategy to an industrial strategy for defence.

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* Professor Paul Cornish, a former British Army armoured officer, is Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Exeter and Founding Director of the Centre for the Public Understanding of Defence and Security. Peter Roberts became an author, researcher and broadcaster after leaving the Royal Navy. His books, The Western Way of War (2024) and War’s Changed Landscape? are available from Howgate Publishing. General Sir Jack Deverell was a British Army infantry officer whose final appointment was Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe, a NATO post. Since retiring he has been an Associate of Cityforum. Air Marshal Greg Bagwell is a retired Royal Air Force officer and pilot. In addition to commercial roles in the aerospace industry he is current President of the Air & Space Power Association. Paul Hough is a former UK and European defence industry executive and a former adviser to the House of Commons Defence Committee.

[1] UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. Equivalents exist for operations on land (Unmanned Ground Vehicle or UGV) and at sea (Unmanned Surface Vessel or USV). In all cases, ‘unmanned’ can be substituted by ‘uncrewed’.

[2] ISTAR: Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance.

[3] GIUK: Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom.

[4] SQEP: Suitability Qualified and Experienced Person.

[5] WBIED: Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Device.

[6] EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

[7] Renegotiation of UK naval support to NATO will be required, removing the offer of carrier strike and amphibious capabilities.

[8] AOR: Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment. AFSH: Auxiliary Fleet Support.

[9] ISTAR: Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance.

[10] GCAP: Global Combat Air Programme.

[11] AEW: Airborne Early Warning. MPA: Maritime Patrol Aircraft. RPA: Remotely Piloted Aircraft.